Democratizing Finance
Democratic Theory and Financial Capitalism
Leah Downey and Stefan Eich, “What Would It Mean to Democratize Finance? An Evaluation of Divergent Conceptions of Democracy and Finance” (2025)
Abstract: Calls to “democratize finance” abound today. But behind this seeming consensus on the democratic deficit of finance loom radically divergent conceptions of both finance and democracy. We engage in a ground-clearing exercise to map these various demands to democratize finance by distinguishing between access- and power-based conceptions of democracy, and by differentiating between three dimensions of finance: payment, investment, and banking. This mapping allows us to make three contributions. First, we critique conceptions of democracy understood as mere access based on unequal inclusion, describing them as a form of “counterfeit democracy.” Second, we argue that conceptions of financial democracy based on access as equal inclusion are more promising but contain within them a tension that pushes towards acknowledging questions of public power and how to democratically share it. Third, we set out some key parameters for a more promising conceptual frame to assess democratization in the realm of finance.
Figure 2: Agents of Public Control
From Eich and Downey, “What Would It Mean to Democratize Finance? An Evaluation of Divergent Conceptions of Democracy and Finance” (2025)
Figure 3: Democracy and Finance Mapped
From Eich and Downey, “What Would It Mean to Democratize Finance? An Evaluation of Divergent Conceptions of Democracy and Finance” (2025)
Abstract: This article interrogates the contemporary appeal of crypto-politics and gamified retail finance through the lens of democracy. It introduces the concept of counterfeit democracy to capture how claims to “democratize finance” mobilize democratic language while emptying it of its substantive political meaning. Crypto-political imaginaries promise empowerment through access—access to markets, platforms, and speculative opportunity—while displacing democracy as a practice of collective judgment over an uncertain future. The article traces how this logic emerged from earlier attempts to depoliticize monetary governance and why it continues to resonate under conditions of economic precarity and weakened democratic institutions. By distinguishing between democracy as collective power and gambling as individualized exposure to risk, we show how speculative participation comes to stand in for democratic agency itself. The article concludes that resisting crypto’s appeal requires confronting the hollowing out of democratic economic institutions, not merely condemning speculation.